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1. INTRODUCTION
A majorfeature ofthe financial market of most developing countries is
the predominance of the informal financial sector. Also referred to as the
noninstitutional or unorganized financial market, the informal financial
market covers all financial activities not within the purview of formal
regulations imposed on the formal sector in respect to capital, reserve and
liquidity requirements, ceilingon lendingand deposit rates, mandatory credit
targets, and audit and reporting requirements. A heterogeneous sector
composed of moneylenders, landlords, traders, input traders, etc., itsmain
distinctive characteristics are ease of entry and exit, informality oftransac-
tions and small loan size. Although there are no accurate estimates of its
size, intercountry comparative estimates indicate a rough figure of three-
fourths the size of the formal financial market (Wai 1980).
The importance of the rural informal financial market cannot be
overemphasized. It performs thevital function of channelling credit to small
and poor borrowers outside the reach of the formal financial system.
Similarly, it helps in the mobilization of rural savings through various
innovative mechanisms and arrangements exemplified byindigenous rotat-
ingsavings and credit associations (ROSCAs) and credit unions.
The importance attached to the functions of the informal financial
market, however, has been largely overlooked bythe widespread view that
informal credit sourcesare exploitative. As aresult, financial market policies
havebeen gearedtowards minimizing, if nottotally eliminating, the informal
lenders viaa host of policies and measures aimed at increasing institutional
credit flows and/or providing competition. The extent to which financial
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markets and other macroeconomic and sectoral policies impinge on the
operations of rural informal credit markets, however, remains little under-
stood.
This paper addresses the above concern. Using results from various
surveys, we examine how changes inruralfinancial marketsand agricultural
sector policies contributed in shaping the structure and operations of rural
informal credit markets in the Philippines. It is to be emphasized that,
because of the nature of the data, the results should be interpreted as
indications of directions rather than as strict causal relationships.
The paper isdivided into five sections. Section 2 outlines the concep-
tual framework of the review. Section 3 discussesthe developments inthe
macroeconomic and agricultural sector policy environment. The fourth
section examines the changes overtime in the structure and operations of
rural informal credit markets (RICMs) inthe Philippines based on results of
various farm and national level surveys. Finally, section 5 draws lessonsfor
policy.
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
In order to understand how public policy impacts on the informal
financial market it is important to identify the unique and fundamental
differences between the informal financial market and the formal system.
These differences are: (1) the absence of formal regulatory controls on the
former's operations; and (2) the pervasiveness of interlocking relationships
between informal credit market transactions and othertransactions in other
factor andproduct markets. 1Becauseofthis latter characteristic, the impact
of public policy on other markets to which the credit market isinterlinked
generates spillover effects that importantly shape the qualitative and
quantitative dimensions of its development.
There aretwo ways by which publicpoliciesaffect the performance of
the informal financial market. The first isthrough monetary and financial
market policiesaimed at influencingthe performance ofthe financial market
in general. The impact ofthese policiesistransmitted through the financial
system as banks and other financialintermediaries respondthrough portfo-
lioadjustment to changes in the relative rates of returns and risk of various
financial assets and instruments. The other channel is via the spillover
effects of policieson markets through which the credit market isinterlinked.
These impacts aretransmitted through a number ofchannels, viz., through
changes in underlying production relations, production technology, and
changes in material or physical attributes (e.g., changes in the size and
1. Forempiricalstudies onthePhilippines, see TBAC (1981).QuiSones (1982),Serrano
(1983)°Roro (1985),Geron (1989),Baufista (1989,1990)and Esguerra (1990).BAUTISTA: RURAL INFORMAL CREDIT MARKET 75
spatial distribution of production units). Figure 1 illustrates these interrela-
tionships.
Fora clearer picture of these interrelationships, consider the case of
the impact of the so-called meso variables (markets and infrastructure). As
a concrete example, considerthe case of a landreform program which alters
the underlying production relationsand the collateral value of land. Ina pre-
landreform situation inwhich landlords are the principalsource of informal
finance, a land reform program may result ina significant reduction in the
supply of informalcreditsincethe incentive effect ofcreditin elicitingoptimal
effort levels under atenancy contract issevered.2 Onthe other hand, to the
extent that land reform implementation confers full ownership rights on
farmer-cultivators, an increased demand for formal credit with potential
spillover effects on the informal credit market may result. Similarly a yield-
increasing technical change associated with irrigation, modern varieties and
purchased inputs clearly increases the demand for harvest labor and thus
exacerbates the seasonality of labor demand. Given constraints in family
labor supply, aninduced increase incredit demand to meet short-term peak
season labor requirements may be observed.
Inthe case of output price, the impact depends on whether or not the
credit contract involves interlinkedtransactions. Geron (1989) and Fabella
(1989) analyzed the effect of output price in an interlinked credit arrange-
ment. Under a monopolistic arrangement in which a trader-lender can set
interest rate and output price inan interlinked contract, it isshown that an
increase in the buying price increases the volume of borrowing or, con-
versely, the volume of lending through its effect on income, assuming no
constaints on the lender's supply offunds.
In the case of rural infrastructure, the impact on financial markets is
indirect. Empirical analysis on the subject israre not only because of the
methodological difficulty inattributing the impact on specific variables but
also inobtaining a reliable indexof interest rate ininformal credit markets or
quantifying the volume of aggregate informal lending in agiven area. Of the
few studies on this subject, Ahmed and Hossain (1990) analyzed the effect
ofinfrastructure on ruralsavingsand investment. Ahmed and Hossainfound
that the effect ofrural infrastructure isindirect, operating as itdoes through
itseffect on income. In the case of rural roads, ananalysis byGarcia (1984)
showed that the construction of rural roadssignificantly increased house-
hold income and employment opportunities. Intuitively, since an improve-
ment in rural infrastructure (e.g., roads, irrigation) reduces transactions
costs, thereby increasing the efficiency of market trades both in goods and
financial markets, itisexpected that the volume of lending will substantially
2. The incentive role ofcredit ininterlinked transactions isexpounded inBraverman and
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increase. The impact on the informal credit market, however, is, a priori,
ambiguous.Tothe extent that the improvement and availabilityof infrastruc-
ture leads to the entry of more banking units that can effectively provide
competition to informal sources, then the volume of lending and interest
ratesfrom the informal credit market may decline. Onthe other hand, if new
bank entrants donot possess comparative advantage inlending and instead
serve asa source ofadditional liquidity to informal credit sources, i.e., inthe
form of trade capital as in the case of trader lenders, an increase in the
volume of lending from the informal credit market may result. Depending on
the initial conditions in the various markets, their interactions, and the
underlying microeconomic behavior of agents in specific transactions the
impact of meso variables is, a priori, difficult to predict.
in the case of financial market policies the impact on informal credit
markets depends onwhether informal financial markets are relatively well-
integrated with the formalfinancialsystem. Ifa well-developed and function-
ingfinancialmarket exists, expansionary monetary policieswill, otherthings
the same, cause interest ratesto fall. Ifthe informal financial market iswell-
integrated with the formal financial market, thedecline in interest rate inthe
formal system should affect interest rates in the informal system as
householdsand firms respondtothe relativecostofcapital between the two
sectors.
The above framework assumes the existence of well-developed
financial markets and abstracts from political economy considerations that
normally underlie publicpolicy making. Formost developing countries this
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exception rather than the rule, A pervasive feature of financial and other
factor markets in developing countriesistheirhigh degree offragmentation.
This fragmentation issuch that households not onlyhave limited access to
but face different rates of return on land, labor and capital. The situation is
further compounded byvarious policy distortions on specific markets inthe
rural economy. Under this setting, political economy considerations of
cheap credit or interventions in the rural financial market through supply-
lending financial market policieshave been widely advocated and adopted.
Underlying these interventionsareviews widely heldby policymakers onthe
roleof finance indevelopment. Among these isthe perception that credit is
aprerequisitefor theadoption ofthe new package ofagriculturaltechnology.
Similarly, the provision of cheap credit isseen as a corrective measure or
second-best policy to ameliorate policy biases against agriculture. Finally,
the provision of cheap credit is envisioned to supplant and/or provide
competition to informal credit sources that are viewed as exploitative.
Sincethe target beneficiaries areusually perceived as poor credit risks
byformal financial institutions, governments have to rely either on direct
and/or indirect methodsof allocatingcredit to thesebeneficiaries. As various
country experiences show, governments have either channelled financial
resources directly via the bureaucracy itself or used the facilities of the
financial system. Inthe case ofthe former, specialized agricultural develop-
ment banks and/or line agencies are usually created to operate loan
programsfor target beneficiaries. Onthe other hand, to induce banks to lend
to preferred sectors, governments implement various selective credit
policies and fiscal incentives such as differential rediscount and interest
rates, and/or enact specific banking regulations. The latter include a loan
quota to specific sectors, credit ceiling and deposit retention schemes, as
in the case of the Philippines. The net effects of these policies on rural
financial market development in general and on the informal credit market
in particular and their implications for rural financial market reforms are
discussed in the next sections.
3. AGRICULTURAL SECTOR AND FINANCIAL MARKET
DEVELOPMENTS
In the previous section, we hypothesized that although the informal
financial market is outside the purview of the formal regulatory system,
macroeconomic and sectoral policies exert important influences on its
development. Inthis section, we review and identify some ofthese specific
policiesfrom 1970 to 1990 which affected the development ofthe informal
credit market in the Philippines. Tables 1 and 2 present a listing of these
policies.
1970s. During the period 1970-90, both the financial market and the
agricultural sector policy environment underwent significant changes in78 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 1




Administratively determinedceilingon depositand loan rates. For
loans,ceilingwas12%forsupervisedcreditand14%for nonsupervised
credit. Fordeposits,6% for savingsand 6.5 - 8% fortime.
Rediscounting/Special Time Deposits(STDs)
Preferentialrediscounting foragricultural activities bothintermsof loan
valueandrate.Rediscount rateforagricultural loanswassetat 1%p.a.
for supervisedcreditand 5% for nonsupervised credit.
Lowcostfundsfor financialinstitutions throughSTDs at 3% p.a.
LoanQuota




At least 75% of total depositsaccumulatedby branches,agencies,




o Uniformrediscountrate. Rediscountratewaslinkedtothe Manila
Reference Rate (MRR).
o CentralBankprogramforselective rehabilitation ofruralbanks.
o Phasingoutofdevelopmental bankingfunctionofthe CentralBank
- Transfer of variousspeciallendingprogramssuch as the Inte-
grated RuralFinancing(IRF) andtheAgricultural LoanFundtothe
Land Bankof the Philippines (LBP).
o Terminationof directlendingprogramsbynonfinancial government
institutionsandthe consolidation of agriculturallendingfunds into
the ComprehensiveAgriculturalLoan Fund(CALF).
o Expansionofguaranteeprogramsunderthe CALFfacility.
o Liberalized bank branchingrestrictions.Liftingof the required
purchasebybanksof low-yielding governmentsecurities.BAUTISTA: RURAL INFORMAL CREDITMARKET 79
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and commoditiesvia marketingparastatalsinfertilizer and pesticide
(Fertilizerand PesticideAuthority),sugar(PhilippineSugarCommis-






o lift_ng of the copraexportban andthe exporttax on coconutoil
o abolitionof monopolisticarrangementsinsugarand coconuttrading
o liberalization offertilizer importation and distribution





orientation. In the 1970s government policywas characterized by pervasive
direct and indirect intervention in the product, input and overall incentive
structure of the economy. Financial market policiesfollowed the supply-led
approach characterized by liberal provision of credit through interest rate
subsidy, loan quota, preferential rediscounting and a host of other selective
creditand complementary fiscal incentivestofinancial institutions lendingto
agriculture.80 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Intheagricultural sector,governmentextensivelyintervened through
pricinganddistribution policies viatheestablishment ofmarketing parastatals,
publicinvestmentandagriculturalresearchandextension.Additionally,a
landreformprogramonriceandcornlandswasimplemented alongwiththe
provision of apackage ofyield-increasing ricetechnology basedonmodern
ricevarieties,chemicalfertilizerandirrigation.
1980s.Thosepolicies continuedtobeimplemented wellintotheearly
1980s untiltheeconomic crisis in1983 andthesubsequent political change
ingovernmentin1986 forcedareorientation ofeconomicpolicies towards
amore" marketfriendly"approach.Insharpcontrasttotheliberalfinancial
marketpolicies andpervasiveintervention inagriculturethatcharacterized
the1970s, the1980ssawtheadoption andimplementation ofpolicyreforms
aimedatenhancing theefficiencyandproductivity oftheeconomythrough
the removalof distortionarymacroeconomic andsectoralpolicies.These
reformswere engenderedbyanumberofconsiderations.
In agriculture,developmentsin the internationalmarket and the
associatedwelfare andefficiencylossesto the economycreatedstrong
pressure forchange.Althoughpervasive directandindirectinterventions by
governmentintheagricultural sectorcreatedanincentivestructurethat is
significantly biasedagainst agriculture, thesectorpostedsignificant growth
for the most part of the 1970s. This was largelydue to the impactof
investmentin ruralinfrastructure,principally irrigationandtechnological
change.Sincethe mid-1960s increases inyieldhaveaccountedforabout
80 percentoftotalagriculturalproductiongrowth. Whereasthecultivated
areaperfarmworkerdeclinedbyanannualaverageof2,5 percentduring
the period,yieldgrewby anannualaverageof about5 percent,enabling
outputperworkertogrowbyabout2percentannually(Davideta/. 1984).
During the1980sthisproductivity growthtapered offsignificantly especially
inthefoodsector.Thiswasduetoanumberoffactors.Bythemid-1980s,
about85 percentofthetotalriceareawasplantedto modernricevarieties,
andnearly65 percentofthiswas irrigated. Fertilizeruseonricealsorose
from8 kgNPKperhectareinthemid-1960s to40 kgNPKperhectareinthe
mido1980s(Balisacan1991). Governmentinvestmentinagriculturealso
significantlydeclined,resultingin poormaintenanceand a consequent
deterioration inruralinfrastucture.Moreimportantly,withthechangeinthe
world economicenvironmentin the 1980s, the impact of the various
macroeconomicand sectoralpoliciesbiasedagainstagriculturewas in-
creasinglyfelt as Philippineagriculturebegan to loseits international
competitivenesseveninsectorsinwhichittraditionallyhadcomparative
advantage.
These developmentscreatedstrong pressurefor the adoptionof
majorpolicyreforms.Followingtheadoptionofthe recommendedpolicy
reformmeasuresdraftedbyagroupofeconomistsbasedatthe University
ofthePhilippines inLosBa_os,the Philippine governmentin 1986 movedBAUTISTA: RURAL INFORMAL CREDIT MARKET 81
quickly to reduce distortions against agriculture and to remove institutional
constraints inthe sector. Major actions included: (1) the lifting of the export
ban on copra; (2) the abolitionof monopolies and monopolistic structures in
sugar, coconut and, later, infertilizer; (3) the liberalizationof urea and potash
imports and distribution; (4) the abolition of export taxes except those on
logs; and (5) the withdrawal ofthe National Food Authority from trading in
wheat, flour, and feed ingredients, among others.
In the financial market, initial policy reforms came much early on as
part of the policy conditionalities tacked on to the various structural
adjustment loans. In 1981 initialreforms inthefinancial market were started
to enhance the effficiency ofthe financial system through the elimination of
regulated interest rates and other distortionary policies. Ceilings on interest
rates on deposits were lifted while rediscount rates for agricultural papers
were adjusted from 1to 3 percent per annum. Reserve requirements were
alsoprogrammed for reduction but got deferred asthe country experienced
itsworst postwar political crisisin 1983.
In 1986 rural financial market policy took on a new orientation.
Underlying the new thrust in ruralfinancial market policy was the Philippine
experience in cheap credit policy in the 1970s. The pervasive implementa-
tion of various interventions in the financial market led to mounting loan
arrearages,hugefinancialburdensand allocativeinefficiencyinthe economy.
The convenient access to cheap credit by rural banks inhibited real financial
intermediation inthe rural economy. Savingsmobilization was neglected as
ruralbanks obtained more than half oftheir Ioanablefunds from specialtime
deposits and rediscounts with the Central Bank (Llanto and Neff 1985).
Rural banks, in effect, became mere conduits of government credits,
performing little banking functions and savings mobilization. In the same
manner, since interest rates subsidies were largely captured by formal
lenders and bigger farmers this worsened rural income distribution 3
To strengthen the rural financial system, the Central Bank imple-
mented a selective financial rehabilitation of therural banking system aimed
at enabling rural banks with the problem of arrearages to resume normal
banking operations. The program contained a host of measures and
incentive mechanisms designed to assist rural banks to liquidate their
arrearages and at the same time strengthen their financial position.4 To
rationalize the agricultural credit system, the government, through the
3. For ediscussion of the income distribution ofcredit subsidy in the Philippines, see
Esguerra (1981 ).
4. For adisoussion ofthe mechanics of the program, seeDominguez (1988).The 1987
financial rehabilitation package for rural banks has beenlately complemented by anew financial
enhancement program called Countryside Financial Institution Enhancement Program. The
program aims to enhance the overall financial Gapability and stability of rural banks by
encouragingexisting ornew stockholders to infusefresh equitythrough three alternative modules
made available to participating rural banks.82 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
AgricUltural Credit Policy Council (ACPC) undertook the consolidation of
funds previously earmarked for agricultural credit programs into a pool of
funds called the Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF); The policy
orientation hastwo majorfeatures, viz., the termination of alldirect lending
programs administered by nonbank institutions and greater emphasis on
the market mechanism inthe allocation and pricing of credit resources. As
a concrete expression of the new policy reorientation, publicly-backed
agriculturalcreditguarantee schemeswere promotedand supported through
capital allocation from the CALF portfolio. One of the bases of the policy
orientation was the view that the key to integrating the ruralfinancial market
isfinancial innovation throughthe reduction of lending risk and administra-
tive cost inherent inagricultural lending. Further, since the decision making
process under guarantee programs is left to the bank and the borrower,
guarantee mechanisms are perceived to have only minimal distortions.
Initially the CALF was operated as a guarantee fund through three
existing guarantee institutions, viz., QuedanGuarantee Fund Board (QGFB),
Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises (GFSME), and Philip-
pineCrop Insurance Corporation (PCIC).S By1988, itsoperations had been
expanded to other activities, viz., provision ofliquidity financing through the
LandBankofthe Philippines' rediscounting window, ruralfinancing through
viablenongovernmental organizations, andthe provisionoftechnical assist-
ance and funding supportfor the replication of innovative financial interme-
diation schemes such as the Grameen Bank experience of Bangladesh.
Asthe nextsection illustratesthe changingpolicy environment exerted
direct and indirect effects in shaping the qualitative and quantiatative
dimensions of informal credit markets in the Philippines.
4. IMPACT OF ECONOMIC POLICIES ON INFORMAL
CREDIT MARKETS
Although a direct estimation of the impact of public policy on the
informal credit market may not be feasible given the data constraint, an
indication ofthe impact of policiescan begleaned bylooking at the observed
changes over time in the structure and operations of rural informal credit
markets. These changes may be either quantitative as reflected inthe size
and levels of interest rates or qualitative as reflected in the changes in
various aspects of informal credit market operations.
5. The oparatlon of the CALF creditguarantee program was expanded in 1989 to include
the Bagong Pagkain ng Bayan (BPnB).The Quedan Guarantee FundBoard operates the quedan
system ofloan guarantee based on warehouse receipts or quedans ofstorable commodities.
GFSME provides credit guarantee and other suppport tosmall and medium enterprises. PCIC
provides credit guarant as to loans of no more than P150,OOOto small farmers owning no more
than seven hectares. Finallythe BPnBoperates acredit guarantee scheme for loans extended
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Quantitative Changes in Rural Informal Credit Markets
Size ot the informal credit market. Empirical evidence from various
Asian countries indicate that changes inpolicy environment impinge on the
size ofthe informal credit market (ADB 1990). In the Philippines, evidence
from various surveys from the 1950s to the 1980s revealed temporal
changes in the size of the rural informal credit market both in terms of the
proportion of borrowing households from informal credit sources and as a
proportion to total loan transactions. Duringthe 1950s and the 1960s, 75
to 90 percent of rural households borrowed from informal sources. By the
1970s, various survey results had shown an unmistakable decline in the
importance of informal credit sources. This decline was reversed in the
1980s, reverting tothe levels of the 1960s (Table 3).
The observed trends areconsistent with the hypothesized behaviorof
the informal credit market in response to the changing macroeconomic
policyenvironment. The predominance ofinformal sourcesoffinance during
the 1950s and 1960s can beattributed to the largely agrarian nature of the
economy and to the nascent stage ofthe Philippinefinancialsystem. Except
for major urban centers, bank branches outside the capital city remained
limited. As of 1988, about 44 percent ofthe total municipalities and cities in
the country were without banks. Density ratios across regions also reveal
the skewed distribution of banks. The National Capitol Region was
"overbanked" with about 65 banks servicingeachmunicipality. The rest of
thecountry is"underbanked" interms of inadequate orno bankingfacilities
at allin some municipalities (Chan 1988).
On theother hand, the significant declineinthe importance of informal
credit sources during the 1970s coincided with two important changes in
policy environment during the period. First, the nationwide land reform
implementation in rice and corn lands in 1972 altered the then existing
production relationship in land tenure from share-tenancy to fixed rent or
leasehold. This change altered the underlying incentive structure embodied
in a share tenancy contract from that of a land-labor-credit link contract to
one inwhich theriskistotally borne bythe lesseeunder afixed rent contract.
Since the "incentive effect" of credit was severed, the volume of informal
creditsignificantly declinedas landlordsbecamethe majorsource offinance
in the rural economy. Second, as a complementary measure to the land
reform program, the government, during the period, implemented a liberal
credit policy aimed at directing the flow of institutional credit to agriculture.
As aresult, institutionalcreditflows to agriculture increasedfrom P3.2 billion
in 1973 to P9.0 billioninrealterms in 1981 -a resultof both liberalcreditand
bank branching policy. Duringthe period,the number of ruralbanks grew by
7.3 percent per annum or an equivalent of 56 new rural banks per year.
The expansion of formal credit inthe 1970s proved rather temporary.
First, mounting loanarrearages inthe late 1970s disqualified an inc,easing84 JOURNALOFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 3
AVERAGE RELATIVE PROPORTION OF BORROWERS
BORROWING FROM INFORMAL CREDIT MARKET AND
PROPORTION OF INFORMAL LOANS TO TOTAL
LOAN TRANSACTIONS
(Various Surveys)"
Percentof borrowers Percentof informalloans






a. SeeAppendix Tables I and2forthesurveys considered. Although thenumerical
results aresensitive tospecific surveys, thepattern ingeneral reflects theobserved trend.
number of rural banks from the rediscounting facility of the Central Bank
which has been the main source of cheap credit to small farmers. As rural
banks rationed credit to onlythe most creditworthy borrowers, disqualified
borrowers shifted back tothe informal credit market (TBAC 1986). Second,
the banking reforms initiated in 1981 led to upward adjustments in both
interest on deposits, loans and rediscounts plusthe gradual elimination of
various subsidies and inthe fiscal incentives enjoyed by rural banks. Since
most ruralbanks had a low deposit baseto effectively sustain their lending,
farm credit took a dramatic plunge. This situation was further compounded
by the political crisisin 1983 when the Central Bank, to stem the flight of
capital, had to exercise a verytight monetary policy that sent interest rates
soaringto 40 percent. This strategy became a virtual attack on the financial
system as banks were besieged with pretermination of time deposits by
depositors seekingto shift theirportfolio intohigh-yielding Central Bankbills.
The banking system virtually stopped lending to agriculture as the high-
yielding centralbank instrument proved too tempting and secure. Asa result
outstanding loansto agriculture in nominal terms by commercial banks fell
by 35.9 percent in 1984 and by 0.3 percent in 1985 (Montes 1987), This
contraction inthe formal credit system was apparently filled in by informal
credit sources.
Itisto benoted, however, that whilethe informalcreditmarket expands
or contracts inresponse to changes in policy environment, the extent of its
response islimited to that part of itwhich is"reactive," i.e., the part whichBAUTISTA: RURALINFORMAL CREDIT MARKET 85
responds to controls over and deficiencies in the formal system. This
distinction made by Chandavarkar isimportant since there isalimit beyond
which expansion inthe formal system caneffectively substitute for informal
credit. Thislimit issuch that, becauseof the increasing perunit transactions
cost of administering small loans or of financial innovations, the formal
system is unlikely to serve these loan sizes or clients. Thus, formal and
informal loans may be substitutes at some range of loan size but not at
smaller loan sizes.
Interestrates in informalcred/tmarkets. Two interrelated features of
informal credit markets are the high levels and degree of variability of
interest rates. A large number of empirical studies have documented
interest ratesrangingfrom ashigh as 200 percent toas low as zero percent,s
This diversity isa common andexpected feature of informal credit markets
owing to differences among lenders on their cost structure, risk bearing
attitude and portfolio, among others.
Although there is no conclusive empirical evidence indicating a
systematic decline over time in the levels ofinterest rates on informal loans,
some evidence from various sources seems to point towards this direction
(Table 4). A number of reasons may account for such trend. First, the
development ofthe financial system, especially the establishment of more
rural banks and branches of private banks, may have provided more
competition to informal sources of finance. The TBAC survey in 1981, for
instance, noted that average interest rate in Bulacanwas lowest among the
three provinces included in the survey dueto the presence ofmorebanking
units. Similar results were observed in India. Iqbal's (1988) study found
evidence of a reduction in moneylender monopoly power as a result of
increased competition from formal lendingagencies. Second, the decline in
interest rate may be attributed to a general improvement in economic
conditions inthe rural economy. Technological change and an expansion in
irrigation and infrastructure that contribute to lower transactions costs and
riskexert downward trends ininterest rates. Floro (1986) found that interest
rates on informal loans inthe more developed areas tend to be much lower
than those ineconomicallyless developed areas. Similarly, Igbal found that
farmers residing in areas characterized by the useof the Green Revolution
technology could avail themselves of a lower moneylender interest rate.
Although these results may not be conclusive at this point in time, they
suggest that rural informal credit market conditions are responsive to the
economic environment, contrary to the perceived wisdom. Thus, a key to
financial market development may lie in the adoption of appropriate
nonfinancial market policiesthat lower thetransactions costsoftrades inthe
ruraleconomy.
6. cf.footnote 1.86 JOURNAL OFPHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
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Structure of Rural Informal Credit Markets
Apart from the impact of policy on the quantitative dimension of the
informal credit market, it hasbeen observed that changes inpolicy environ-
ment affect the qualitative nature of the informal credit market. Belland
Srinivasan (1985), for instance, observed that the regulation of the opera-
tions of formal credit institutions in India has led to a significant degree of
market segmentation, with appreciable spillover effects ontransactions in
the ICM. Similar changes in the qualitative aspects of ICM that include
changes inthe market share of various types of lenders, in loanuse, and in
the collateral substitute and levels of interest rate are revealed bydata from
various surveys. Table 5 summarizes these qualitative changes in the
RICM.
Composition of informal lenders. Evidence from various surveys
revealed that while landlords were the major source of informal finance
during the 1960s, traders, millers,input dealersand, in someareas, farmers
themselves became the major informal creditors during the 1970s and
1980s particularly in major rice producing areas. However, in areas where
neither technological change nor effective land reform was implemented,
the importance oflandlords as the principal source of rural credit remained.
As we noted in the previous section, land reform implementation
altered if not totally severed the land-labor-credit interlinkage embodied in
existing share tenancy contracts. As a result, landlords' supply of creditto
their tenants contracted significantly. Simultaneously, the pervasive adop-Table 5
OBSERVED QUALITATIVE CHANGES IN RURAL INFORMAL CREDIT MARKETS '-
1950s - 1960s 1970s 1980s _o
C
_g
Type of Lenders Landlords Traders Traders r->
Relatives&friends Inputdealers Farmers z
•Privatemoneylenders Millers Millers o
Landlords Inputdealers _
Relatives&friends Landlords t- o
Privatemoneylenders Relatives& friends m o
Privatemoneylenders -7
Loan Use Primarilyfor Shifttowardsmore
consumption productiveuse
of loans
Collateral Substitute Interlinked Greater incidence Increasingimportance
land-labor-credit ofcredit-product of tabor-credit
contractembodiedin marketinterlinked interlinked contract
share - tenancy contractsortie wl the emergenceof





tion of yield increasing technology hastened the commercialization of the
rice economy as greater reliance on purchased inputs and bigger market-
able surplus led to the increased roles of input dealers, millers and traders
inthe ruraleconomy. With relatively easierand lower entry costs atthe lower
end of the market, increased competition occasioned bythe entry of new
traders and/or commission agents of established traders/millers led tothe
increased incidence of interlinked credit and product contracts.
Onthe other hand, the increasing importance offarmer-lenders in the
rural credit market can betraced to developments in the agricultural labor
market. The significant increasein productivity engendered by the new rice
technology and the fixing of land rentals under land reform regulation
generated a surplus for lessees (Hayami and Kikuchi 1981 ). As rents rose
relative to wages, those with equity in land enjoyed an increase in wealth.
In addition, higher land equity enhanced the farmer's ability to borrow at
lower interest rates. This income effect helped push farmers to a higher
positioninthe agricultural income ladder (Roumasset and Smith 1981 ).The
increasedincome inducedthesubstitution of hiredfor family laborespecially
in farm operations where quality shirking can be easily done by ex post
inspection ofthe field. Coupled with the accentuation of peak season labor
requirement, an induced increased demand for permanent or semiattached
workers hasemergedto reduce monitoringcost. Embodiedinsuch contract,
asobserved in Central Luzon, isthe provision ofcredit (Hayami and Otsuka
1989). This institutional change inlabor markets explains the emerging role
offarmers in informal credit transactions.
Loan use. Interrelated to the observed change inthe types of lenders
was the observed change in the productive use of the Ioan_Although the
fungibility ofloan usewas animportant issue,results from various surveys
showed an unmistakable trend indicated by the shift in loan purpose from
one that is essentially consumptive in nature in the 1960s to one that is
Pr0duction-oriented especially in rice-growing areas where the pervasive
adoption of the new rice technology induced an increased demand for
purchased inputs such asfertilizer and chemical insecticides. On the other
hand, in areas where technological change in agriculture had not made a
significant impact, the useof informal credit has remained consumptive in
nature.
Collateral substitute. Unliketransactions inthe formal finan-
cialsystem wherein the use of collateral ismore the rulethan the exception,
the converse holds true in RICM transactions. Informal lenders, however,
employ a variety of collateral substitutes. These includethird parW guaran-
tee, threat of future borrowing opportunities and interlinked contracts. The
latter arecontracts wherein borrowers and lenderstie or bundletransactions
in credit market with transaction(s) in another market(s). By interlinking
transactions, informal lenders are able to exercise a greater degree of
control because the possibility of discovery of dishonesty or shirking by anBAUTISTA: RURAL INFORMAL CREDITMARKET as
agentinone transaction ismadecostly for him interms of spillover effects
threateningothertransactions (Bardhan1980).
Asthe relativeimportanceof variousinformallenderschangedover
time, so did the observeduseof specifictypes of collateralsubstitutes
especiallyin rice-growingareas.Tie-in salesand labor-creditinterlinked
contractsincreasingly dominatedothercontractualarrangements inareas
wherepervasivetechnicalchangeoccurredandlandreformimplementa-
tionwas widespread.The formerwas to assurethe adequateandtimely





of landreformbeneficiaries. (Nagarajan etal. 1990). Asthesupplyofformal
creditinRe 1980s declined significantly, landpawningbecame aconvenient
instrumentforfacilitatingcredittransactions ininformalcreditmarkets.
Other Features of RICMs
Despite those observedchanges, a coupleof features remained
largelyunchanged. Thesearetherelativelysmallsizeofinformalloansand
theshortduration oftheirmaturity.Asdocumented invarious majorsurveys,
themajorityofinformalloans wereforlessthanP1,000 (Table6)andforless
thansixmonthsinmaturity(Table7). Thesefeatures arisefrom informal






5. CONCLUSION AND LESSONS FOR POLICY
Contraryto the commonimpression,the observedtrends in rural
informal credit markets in the Philippinesrevealedthat financial and
agricultural sectorpolicies havehadvaryingeffectsonruralcreditmarkets.
Whileexpansionary selectivecreditpolicies duringthe 1970s resultedinan
increasedflow offormalcreditto agriculture,this merelysubstitutedfor
informal creditintheshort-termwithouttheconcomitant lasting effectonthe
agriculturalsectoringeneralor onfarmers'creditworthiness inparticular.
Inadvertently,the supply-led approachundermined the viabilityoftherural





DISTRIBUTION OF INFORMAL LOANS BY LOAN SIZE
(Various Surveys, Philippi nes)
BCS BAS (1976-78) FIS RSM ICM
(1960-61) Percent of number (1981-82) i1986) (1987) Loansize
• classes
Percentof 1976 1977 1978 Percentof Percentof Percent of
number number number number
in = 1,540,000) n= 63 n = 62 n =56 in = 1,461) (n = 652) in = 1,764)
< 1,000 99.4 82.4 87.1 82.3 62.5 69.0 71.4 ¢_
O
C
1,000 - 2,000 0.5 15.2 7.7 6.8 18.5 10.6 13.0 _ Z
2,001 - 5,000 O.1 2.4 2.6 9.5 14.6 13.0 8.4 o
'11
"0




> 10,000 .... 0.9 2.5 3.4
m











Table 7 =o C





BAS (1976-78) FIS (1981-82) RSM (1986) ICM (1987) _:
Maturity r->
Percentof Percentof Percentof Percentof Percentof Percentof Percent of Percent of ¢) -n
number amount number amount number amount number amount __
-I
(n = 144) (n = 1,461) (P1,79M) (n =528) (PO.93M) (n = 1,699) (P2,718) ]>
_B
< 6 mos. 062.0 074.7 073.0 092.2 074.6 079.8 066.9 _
7 - 12 mos. 030.0 008.6 011.0 004.7 006.6 018.0 027.7
> 12 m_. 008.0 N.A. 016.7 016.0 003.1 018.8 002.2 005.4"
Total 10010 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a. Nueva Ecija province did not have leans with a maturitylonger than 1 2 months.
Sources of data: See Appendix 1.
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Incontrast, nonfinancial agricultural sector policiesinthe 1970s such
as land reform and public investment in irrigation had more profound and
real effects onthe sector. The expansion ofirrigation hastened the adoption
of yield-increasing technology, resulting in productivity increases and the
development ofruralfactor and product markets. The income effects arising
from productivity increases and the fixing of landrentals under landreform
regulations induced the substitution of hired for family labor especially in
farm activities that canbe easilymonitored through ex post fieldinspection.
As a result, an increased demand and market for permanent labor emerged.
In a similar manner, the larger marketable surplus attracted new entrants
and increased competition inpalay/rice trading and milling.These changes
affected various aspects of rural informal credit markets as reflected
in the credit market structure and specific features of informal credit
markets.
The Philippine experience inrural credit policy suggests that develop-
ing rural financial markets via supply-led finance (given an unfavorable
macroeconomic policy environment) iscounterproductive inthe longterm.
This is because while such policiesmay havethe desired effects of directing
increasedcreditflows to thetargeted sector, thesetend to betemporary and
financially burdensome. Further, the policiesdo not solve the fundamental
source of difficulty in rural financial intermediation that arises from the
material features of agriculture, viz., the high costs and risk of lending to
spatially-dispersed production units and small loan sizes.
As our lessons indicate, such problems may be better addressed
through nonfinancial market policiesaimed at increasing farm productivity,
pricesand incomes through investments in publicinfrastructure intandem
with macroeconomic and sectoral reforms inthe economy. However, inthe
short run, because structural rigidities in the real sectors (product, input
markets, and institutional structure) take a considerable period of time to
ameliorate, the importance of the timing and sequencing of policy reforms
should be explicitly considered. In particular, given the relative speed of
adjustment ofthe financial market vis-a-vis realmarkets, transitional, time-
bound credit mechanisms or projects that enhance supply responsiveness
may berequired as stopgap measures. Byameliorating supply bottlenecks
during the adjustment period, the political cost against fundamental eco-
nomic policy reforms that may lead to policy reversal may be minimized if
not eliminated. These should not, however, substitute for the fundamental
macroeconomic and mesoeconomic reforms. In the context of developing
ruralfinancial markets it may well bethat governments paycloser attention
to developingagriculture and other realsectors through appropriate policies
that lower transactions/information costs and increase the efficiency of
trades inthe economy. Examples of these include landtitling and expendi-
tures in rural infrastructures that reduce transactions cost, informational
asymmetries and, thus, reduce distortions inrural credit markets.BAUTISTA:RURALINFORMALCREDIT MARKET 93
Appendix Table 1




Reference Totalnumber borrowers who
year Surveyarea ofborrowing obtained
respondents informalloans
1980s
1. 1954-55 Nationwide 5,144 farmers 74.0
1960s






3, 1976 NuevaE¢ija,Laguna 85 74,1
CamarinesSur,Iloilo,
ZamboangadelNode
4. 1977 NueveEclja,Laguna, 78 79.5
CamarinesSur,Ilollo,
ZamboangadelNode
5. 1978 NuevaEcija,Laguna 74 76.4
CamarinasSur,licllo,
Zamboangade/Node




7, 1981-82 Nationwide 1,699 farmhouse- 68.2
(FIS) holds
8. 1986 Batangas,Camarines 502 farmand 85,4
(RSM) Sur,Pangasinan, nonfarm
NegrosOriental,Iloilo households




a. Includesfarmer-borrowers orhouseholds whoborrowfrombothformaland informal
sources.
b. In% offarmhouseholds (withcash loansonly)whoreportedbeingmostlydependent
oninformalsource. Of the totalhouseholdsample onlyninehouseholdsreportedtohave
borrowed in kind.
Sources:
I. L. de Guzman,"AnEconomicAnalysisof theMethodsof Farm-Financing in 5,144
Farmsinthe Philippines," 1957.
2. BCS,'Borrowlng Pra(;tices ofFarmHouseholds,May1961"PSSHBulletin SeriesNo.
12,Manila,June1963.
3-5. BASSurvey,1979-78, inTBAC.URBRF'ResearchonRuralFinancialMarketsIn
the Philipplnes." July1979.Mimeographed.94 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Appendix Table 1 footnotes (continued)
6. TBAC, A Studyon the informal RuralFinancial Marketsin Three Selected Provinces
ofthe Philippines, 1981.
7. TBAC, "Small Farm Indebtedness Survey" (Final Report), June 1986.
8. ACPC, RuralSavings Mobilization (RSM)Survey, 198 6.
9. ACPC, informal Credit Market (ICM) Survey, 1987/68.
Appendix Table 2
PERCENT OF LOANS FROM INFORMAL SOURCES
(Various Surveys, Philippines)
Reference Total number Percent of
year : ofloans informal loan
1950s
1. 1954-55 2,411 87.6
1960s
2. 1960-61 1,677,000 91.8
1970S
3. 1976 100 63.0
4. 1977 91 68.0
5. 1978 84 66.7
6. 1978 2,110 82.6
1980S
7. 1981-82 2,i31 68.6
8. 1986 735 91.0
9. 1987,_8 1,800 98.0
Sources:
I. L. de Guzman, "An Economic Analysis of the Methods of Farm-financing Used
in 5,144 Farms in the Philippines," 1957.
2. BCS, "Borrowing Practices of Farm Households, May 1961 ,'* June 1963.
3-5. BASSurvey, 1976-78.
6. TBAC, A Study on the Informal Rural Financial Markets in Three Selected
Provinces of the Philippines, 1981.
7. TBAC, "Small Farm Indebtedness Survey" (Final Report), June 1986.
8. ACPC, RSMSurvey, 1986.
9. ACPC, ICMSurvey, 1987/88.BAUTISTA: RURAL INFORMAL CREDITMARKET 95
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